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Abstract
For some problems, it is difficult for humans
to judge the goodness of AI-proposed solutions.
Irving, Christiano, and Amodei (2018) propose that in
such cases, we may use a debate between two AI systems to
assist the human judge to select a good answer. We introduce
a mathematical framework for modelling this type of debate
and propose that the quality of debate designs may be
measured by the accuracy of the most persuasive answer. We
describe a simple instance of the debate framework called
feature debate and analyze the degree to which such debates
track the truth. We argue that despite being very simple,
feature debates capture many aspects of practical debates
such as the incentives to confuse the judge or stall to prevent
losing. We analyze two special types of debates, those where
arguments constitute independent evidence about the topic,
and those where the information bandwidth of the judge is
limited.
1 Introduction
In recent years, AI systems have performed impressively
in many complex tasks, such as mastering the game of
Go (Silver et al., 2017). However, these results have largely
been limited to tasks with an unambiguous reward function.
To circumvent this limitation, human approval can be used
as a measure of success in vague tasks: For example:
• The goodness of a simulated robot backflip is hard to for-
malize, but an AI system can be trained to maximize the
extent to which a human observer approves of its trajec-
tory
• The goodness of a film-recommendation is subjective, but
an AI system can be trained to maximize the extent to
which a human approves of the recommendation.
Unfortunately, once tasks and solutions get too complicated
to be fully understood by human users, it is difficult to use
human approval to formalize the reward function. For ex-
ample, the AlphaGo algorithm could not be trained by maxi-
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related to this text. The first author was partially supported by
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mizing eachmove’s approval since some of its moves looked
strange or incorrect to human experts.
Irving, Christiano, and Amodei (2018) suggest address-
ing this issue by using AI debate. In their proposal, two
AI systems are tasked with producing answers to a vague
and complex question and then debating the merits of their
answers before a human judge. After considering the argu-
ments brought forward, the human approves one of the an-
swers, thereby allocating reward to the AI system that gener-
ated it. We can apply AI debate to a wide range of questions:
(1) what is the solution of a system of algebraic equations,
(2) which restaurant should I visit today for dinner, or (3)
which of two immigration policies is more socially benefi-
cial. Moreover, (4) a Go match can be viewed as a debate,
where each move is an argument claiming “my strategy is
the better one”, and the winner of the Go-game is called the
winner of the debate.
In debates (1) and (4) it is straightforward to ascertain
which debater won, and so the most convincing answer al-
ways coincides with the most accurate one. In other debates,
such as (2) and (3), misleading arguments may allow a com-
pelling lie to defeat the correct answer. This raises two cen-
tral questions for our work: under what circumstances does
AI debate track truth? And how can debates be designed in
order for accurate answers to prevail over less accurate ones?
While researchers have started exploring these questions
empirically, the theoretical investigation of AI debate has,
at the time of writing this text, mostly been neglected. The
aim of this paper is to begin filling this gap by providing a
theoretical framework for reasoning about AI debate, ana-
lyzing its basic properties, and identifying further questions
that need to be addressed. So that the work is easy to inter-
pret, we tend to err toward explaining each phenomenon in
the simplest model possible, while sketching the extensions
necessary to make each model more realistic.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2, introduces
our model, the debate game, and formalizes the problem of
designing debate games that promote true answers. In Sec-
tion 3, we describe feature debates, an instance of the de-
bate game model where the debaters are only allowed to
make statements about “elementary features” of the world.
Section 4 investigates which feature debates are truth pro-
moting. Section 5 continues by analyzing two important
subclasses of general debates: those with “independent evi-
dence” and those where the judge’s information bandwidth
is limited. Section 6 flags important limitations of the feature
debate model and gives suggestions for future work. Finally,
we review relevant literature (Section 7) and conclude (Sec-
tion 8). The full proofs are presented in Appendix A.
2 The Debate Game Framework
2.1 Debate Games
A debate game (Definition 2) is a zero-sum game1 played
between two AI systems that proceeds as follows: the hu-
man asks a question about the world, then two AI debaters
generate answers and argue that their answer is the better
one. Finally, a judge, typically human, uses this dialogue to
decide which answer is stronger and allocates the greater
share of reward to the debater who produced that answer.
This section formalizes debate games in three steps. First,
a definition is given for the debate environment — the pa-
rameters of a debate game that designers generally cannot
change— then the design elements— those parameters that
can be changed— and finally, the debate game. The motiva-
tion behind the debate environment and design elementswill
be clearer once the debate game is defined (Definition 2).
The debate environment
Definition 1 (Debate environment). A debate environment
is a tuple E = 〈W , π,Q,A, τ, E〉 which consists of:
• An arbitrary setW of worlds and a prior distribution
π ∈ ∆(W) from which the current world is sampled.
• A setQ of questions, where each q ∈ Q is a text string.
• An arbitrary set A of answers.
• A mapping τ : Q×A×W → [0,∞) which measures the
deviation of an answer from the truth about the world.
• A set E of experiments e : W → 2W the judge can per-
form to learn that the current world w belongs to e(w).
One example of a debate is a highly general case whereW
is the set of all the ways our environment might be, q ∈ Q is
the set of questions we might ask, and A are the textual re-
sponses that AI debaters might produce. The mapping τ rep-
resents the deviation from the question’s true answer, while
experiments constitute a cheaper – and possibly less reli-
able – way of obtaining information. For the questionWhich
restaurant should I go to?, τ(w, q, a) could indicate how dis-
satisfied one would be at each restaurant a, and an experi-
ment could indicate my preference between two restaurants
by comparing their menus.
We can also consider much more specific cases. For ex-
ample,W may represent the set of all legal board positions
in Go, and q asks “What is the optimal next move?”
For many kinds of questions, we may set τ(·) = 0 for all
correct answers and τ(·) = 1 for incorrect or invalid ones.
1A two-player zero-sum game is one where the utilities satisfy
u2 = −u1. As a result, it suffices to consider the first player’s util-
ity u1, and assume that player 2 is trying to minimize this number.
The design elements of debate There are some rules for
a debate that a designer can control, called the design ele-
ments:
• the choice of question q and legal answers A(q) ⊂ A,
• communication language Lc (an arbitrary set),
• argumentation protocol P : Q×A2 × L∗c → 2Lc ,• termination condition T ⊂ Q ×A2 × L∗c ,• experiment-selection policy E : T → E , and
• debating incentives ui : T × 2W → [−1, 1].
In practice, some of these rules will be hard-coded, for
example, a designer may restrict the answers to A =
{“yes”, “no”} or make it physically impossible for the de-
bating agents to communicate in anything other than bi-
nary code (Lc = {0, 1}∗). On the other hand, the designer
may outsource the implementation of some rules to a hu-
man judge. For example, a designer can automatically pro-
hibit repetition of a particular string, but the prohibition of
rephrasing of previously made points needs to be delegated
to the judge. Similarly, a debate can automatically terminate
after N rounds, but a judge is needed to end after debaters
no longer say anything relevant.2
Using the debate environment and design elements, a de-
bate game can be formalized as follows:
Definition 2 (Debate and debate game). A debate is a tuple
D = 〈E, q, G〉, where E is a debate environment, q ∈ Q is
a question, and G = (Gq)q∈Q is a debate game. Formally,
eachGq is a two-player zero-sum extensive form
3 game that
proceeds as follows:
1. The world w is sampled from π and shown to debaters 1
and 2 together with the question q.
2. The debaters simultaneously pick answers a1, a2 ∈ A(q).
3. The debaters alternate4 making arguments x1, x2, . . . ∈
Lc, where xj ∈ P (q, a1, a2, x1, . . . , xj−1), stopping once
(q, a1, a2, x1, x2, . . . ) = t ∈ T is a terminated dialogue.
4. A single experiment e = E(t) is selected and its result
e(w) is used as a context for the next step.
5. The debaters receive utilities u1(t, e(w)) ∈ [−1, 1] and
u2(t, e(w)) = −u1(t, e(w)).
6. The answer of the debater with higher utility becomes the
outcome o(w, t) ofD (with ties broken randomly).
2We can distinguish between the designer of the debate, the
person who selects the question q, and the judge who determines
its winner, who may in-practice be different, or the same person.
While the present text does not analyze the role of the human judge
in detail, we believe that for such analysis, it is useful to view the
judge not as a player in the debate game, but rather as some J ∈ J
which parametrizesA(q) = AJ (q), P = P J , T = T J , E = EJ ,
and ui = u
J
i (but not E and Lc). We do, however, sometimes
anthropomorphize parts of debate by speaking as if they were per-
formed by a judge.
3EFGs are a standard model of sequential decision-making, de-
scribed, for example, in (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). Partially-
observable stochastic games (Hansen, Bernstein, and Zilberstein,
2004) constitute an equally valid (Kovarˇı´k et al., 2019) choice of
model.
4That is, debater 1 makes odd arguments x1, x3, . . . while 2
makes x2, x4, etc.
7. Debate error is the resulting deviation τ(q, w, o(w, t))
between the outcome ofD and the true answer to q.
The model makes several simplifications, but can be gen-
eralized in the following straightforward ways:
Remark 3 (Natural extensions of debate games). Debate
games may be generalized with:
• Non-simultaneous answers. The roles in the answering
phase might be asymmetric, in that one debater might see
their opponent’s answer before selecting their own.5
• Debaters with imperfect information. Instead of having
perfect information about w, the debaters might only re-
ceive some imperfect observation I1(w), I2(w). This lim-
itation is particularly relevant for scenarios involving hu-
man preferences, such as the restaurant example.
• Judge interaction. A judge that asks questions and makes
other interjections may be added as a “chance” player J
with fixed strategy.
• Dangerous experiments. In the real world, some exper-
iments might have dangerous side-effects. This may be
modelled by considering experiments e : W → 2W ∪
[−∞,∞]3 which sometimes just give information, but
other times bypass the debate and assign utilities u1, u2
and the debate error directly.
• Generalized outcome-selection policies. Instead of al-
ways adopting the more-favoured, the judge may adopt
an answer according to a mapping o : T × 2W → A,
or may even be given an option of ignoring suspicious or
uninformative debates.
2.2 Properties of debate games
Debate phases and relation to game theory. For the pur-
pose of modelling the debaters’ actions, we distinguish be-
tween the answering phase (step 2 of Definition 2) and
the argumentation phase (step 3). Once q, w, and (a1, a2)
get fixed at the start of the argumentation phase, the util-
ities of the debaters only depend on the subsequent argu-
ments xj raised by the agents. Since the agents have full
information about each argument, the argumentation phase
is a two-player zero-sum sequential game with perfect in-
formation. We denote this game Gqwa1a2 . To analyze the
answering phase, we first recall an important property of
two-player zero-sum games: In every such G′, all Nash-
equilibrium strategies σ∗ result in the same expected util-
ity E σ∗u1 (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008, Thm3.4.4).
This number is called the value of the game and denoted v∗.
Assuming optimal argumentation strategies, each debater
thus knows that playing the argumentation game Gqwa1a2
results in some utility v∗qwa1a2 . This allows them to abstract
away the argumentation phase. By randomizing the order
of argumentation and treating both debaters equally, we can
further ensure that v∗qwa2a1 = −v∗qwa1a2 . As a result, each
answering phase is a symmetric two-player zero-sum matrix
game with actionsA(q) and payoffs v∗wqa1a2 (to player 1).
These observations have an important implication: Fully
general EFGsmight contain complications that make finding
their solutions difficult. However, both the answering game
5As in, e.g., the Devil’s advocate AI (Armstrong, 2017a).
and the argumentation game belong to highly-specific and
well-understood subclasses of EFGs and are thus amenable
to simpler solution techniques.
Measuring the usefulness of debate. We measure the
suitability of a debate design by the degree to which optimal
play by the debaters results in low debate-error. By default,
we focus on the worst-case where both the world and the
debate outcome are selected adversarially from the support
of their respective distributions. We denote the support of a
probability measure p by supp (p).
Definition 4 (Truth promotion). In the following, D =
〈E, q, G〉 is a debate, ǫ ≥ 0, and w always denotes some el-
ement of supp(π), σ a Nash-equilibrium strategy inG, and t
a terminal dialogue compatible with σ in w.D is said to be:
• ǫ-truth promoting (in the worst-case) in w if for each σ,
we have supt τ(q, o(t, w), w) ≤ ǫ,• ǫ-truth promoting if it is ǫ-truth promoting in every w,
• and ǫ-truth promoting in expectation if for each σ, we
have Ew∼πE t∼σ τ(q, o(t, w), w) ≤ ǫ.
When a debate is 0-truth promoting, we refer to it simply as
“truth-promoting”. Finally, we formalize the idealized ver-
sion of the design problem as follows:
Problem 5 (When is debate truth promoting?). For given
〈E, ·, G〉, characterize those q ∈ Q for which any optimal
strategy in 〈E, q, G〉 only gives answers with τ(q, a, w) = 0.
3 Feature Debate
In order to explore the properties that debates can have, it
is useful to have a toy version of the general framework. In
this section, we discuss how questions can be represented
as functions of “elementary features” of the world and de-
scribe a simple debate game in which the arguments are
restricted to revealing these features. This is inspired by
(Irving, Christiano, and Amodei, 2018), where each world
is an image from the MNIST database, elementary features
are pixels, and the question is “Which digit is this?”. Rather
than faithfully capturing all important aspects of debate, the
purpose of the toy model is to provide a simple setting for
investigating some aspects. The limitations of the model are
further discussed in Section 6.
3.1 Defining Feature Debate
Questions about functions. Many questions are naturally
expressed as enquiries qf about some f :W → X
qf := “What is output of f?” (1)
and come accompanied by the answer space A = X (or
A = ∆(X )). Examples include questions of measurement
(“How far is the Moon?”, “How much do I weigh?”) and
classification (“Which digit is on this picture?”, “Will per-
son A beat person B in a poker game?”). For simplicity, we
focus on questions qf about functions f : W → [0, 1] = X
and the truth-mapping τ(q, w, a) := |f(w)− a|.
These assumptions are not very restrictive — they in-
clude binary questions of the type “Is Y true?” (X =
{0, 1}), and their generalizations “How likely is Y to be
true?” and “To what degree is Y true?”. Any debate about
an “n-dimensional question” can be reduced into n “1-
dimensional” debates, and any function f : W → R can
be re-scaled to have range [0, 1].
Feature Debate and Its Basic Properties. In feature de-
bate, we assume that worlds are fully described by their el-
ementary features— i.e. we suppose thatW = Π∞i=1[0, 1]
and denote Wi : w = (wi)
∞
i=1 ∈ W 7→ wi. Moreover, we
assume that each round consists of each debater making one
argument of the form “the value of i-th featureWi is x”. We
consider a judge who can experimentally verify any elemen-
tary feature (but no more than one per debate):
Definition 6 (Feature debate environment). A feature de-
bate environment Fπ is a debate environment where:
• The prior distribution π is a (Borel) probability measure
onW = [0, 1]N.
• Each question pertains to a function f , i.e. Q = {qf | f :
W → [0, 1] measurable}.
• The answers are A = [0, 1].
• The deviation-from-truth is the distance τ(qf , a, w) =
|f(w)− a| between the answer a and the truth f(w).
• Each experiment reveals one feature, i.e. E = {ei | i ∈
N}, where ei(w) := {w˜ | w˜i = wi}.
For full generality, we may want to assume the debaters
can lie about the features, but for the analysis in this paper,
we ignore this case. The reason is that if the opponent can
point out a lie, and then the judge can test and penalize it,
uttering this lie will be sub-optimal. We thus only consider
truthful claims of the form “Wi = wi”. With a slight abuse
of notation, this allows us to identify the communication lan-
guage Lc with the feature-indexing set N. Any argument se-
quence~i := ~ik := (i1, . . . , ik) thus effectively reveals the
corresponding features. (We write “W~i = w~i”.)
We suppose the judge has access to the world-distribution
π ∈ W and can update it correctly on new information, but
only has “patience” to process 2N pieces of evidence. Fi-
nally, the debaters are penalized for any deviation between
their answer and the judge’s final belief and — to make the
debate zero-sum — are rewarded for any deviation of their
opponent. Adopting the qf shorthand introduced earlier, the
formal definition is as follows:
Definition 7 (Feature debate). A feature debateFπ(f,N) =
〈Fπ, qf , G〉 is a debate with the following specific rules:
• A randomly selected player makes the first argument.
• Lc = N and P (f, a1, a2, i1, . . . , ik) := N \ {i1, . . . , ik}.
• After 2N arguments have been made, the judge sets
u1(t, w~i) := |fˆ(w~i)− a2| − |fˆ(w~i)− a1|, where fˆ(w~i) is
the posterior mean
fˆ(w~i) := E π
[
f |W~i = w~i
]
.6
3.2 Optimal play in feature debate
The zero-sum assumption implies that any shift in fˆ(w~i)
will be endorsed by one debater and opposed by the other
6That is, the judge considers the arguments to be generated in-
dependently, using a “naive-Bayes”-like assumption that ignores
the fact that evidence may be selected strategically.
(or both will be indifferent). The following symbols denote
the two extreme values that the judge’s final belief can take,
depending on whether the debater who makes the first argu-
ment aims for high values of fˆ(w~i) and the second debater
aims for low ones (↑↓) or vice versa (↓↑):
fˆ↑↓N (w) :=maxi1 mini2 . . .maxi2N−1 mini2N fˆ(w~i),
fˆ↓↑N (w) :=mini1 maxi2 . . .mini2N−1 maxi2N fˆ(w~i).
Since maxxminy ϕ(x, y) ≤ minymaxx ϕ(x, y) holds for
any ϕ, the second debater always has an edge: (∀w ∈ W) :
fˆ↑↓N (w) ≤ fˆ↓↑N (w). Lemma 8 (i) shows that if the order of
argumentation is randomized as in Definition 7, the optimal
answers lie precisely in these bounds. This result immedi-
ately yields a general error bound (ii)which will serve as an
essential tool for further analysis of feature debate.
Lemma 8 (Optimal play in feature debate). (i) The optimal
answering strategies in Fπ(f,N) are precisely all those that
select answers from the interval [fˆ↑↓N (w), fˆ
↓↑
N (w)].
(ii) In particular, Fπ(f,N) is precisely max{|fˆ↑↓N (w) −
f(w)|, |fˆ↓↑N (w) − f(w)|}-truth promoting in w.
4 When Do Feature Debates Track Truth?
In this section, we assess whether feature debates track truth
under a range of assumptions.
4.1 Truth-Promotion and Critical Debate-Length
Some general debates might be so “biased” that no matter
how many arguments an honest debater uses, they will not
be able to convince the judge of their truth. Proposition 9
ensures that this is not the case in a typical feature debate:
Proposition 9 (Sufficient debate length). Fπ(f,N) is truth-
promoting for functions that depend on ≤ N features.
Proof. In an N -round debate about a question that depends
on≤ N features, either of the players can unilaterally decide
to reveal all relevant information, ensuring that fˆ(w~i2N ) =
f(w). This implies that fˆ↑↓N (w) = fˆ
↓↑
N (w) = f(w). The
result then follows from Lemma 8.
However, Proposition 9 is optimal in the sense that if the
number of rounds is smaller than the number of critical fea-
tures, the resulting debate error might be very high.
Proposition 10 (Necessary debate length). When f depends
on N + 1 features, the debate error in Fπ(f,N) can be 1
(i.e., maximally bad) in the worst-case world and equal to 1
2
in expectation (even for continuous f ).
The “counterexample questions” which this result relies on
are presented in the following Section 4.2. The formal proof
and the continuous case are given in the appendix.
4.2 Three Kinds of Very Difficult Questions
We now construct three classes of questions which cause de-
bate to perform especially poorly7, in ways that are analo-
gous to failures of realistic debates.
7While we focus on results in worst-case worlds, the illustrated
behaviour might become the norm with a biased judge (Sec. 6.2).
Unfair questions. A question may be difficult to debate
when arguing for one side requires more complex argu-
ments. Indeed, consider a feature debate in a world w uni-
formly sampled from Boolean-featured worlds Πi∈NWi =
{0, 1}N, and suppose the debate asks about the conjunctive
function ϕ := W1 ∧ . . . ∧WK for some K ∈ N. In worlds
with w1 = · · · = wK = 1, an honest debater has to reveal
K features to prove that ϕ(w) = 1. On the other hand, a
debater arguing for the false answer a = 0 merely needs
to avoid helping their opponent by revealing the features
W1, . . . ,WK . In particular, this setup shows that a debate
might indeed require as many rounds as there are relevant
features, thus proving the worst-case part of Proposition 10).
Unstable debates. Even if a question does not bias the de-
bate against the true answer as above, the debate outcome
might still be uncertain until the very end. One way this
could happen is if the judge always feels that more informa-
tion is required to get the answer right. Alternatively, every
new argument might come as a surprise to the judge, and be
so persuasive that the judge ends up always taking the side
of whichever debater spoke more recently.
To see how this behavior can arise in our model, consider
the functionψ := xor(W1, . . . ,WK) defined on worlds with
Boolean features, and the world w = (1, 1, . . . ).8 If the
world distribution π is uniform over {0, 1}N, the judge will
reason that no matter what the debaters say, the last unre-
vealed feature from the set {W1, . . . ,WK} always has an
equal chance of flipping the value of ψ and keeping it the
same, resulting in ψˆ(w~i) =
1
2
. As a result, the only optimal
way of playingFπ(ψ,N) is to give the wrong answer a =
1
2
,
unless a single debater can, by themselves, reveal all fea-
tures W1, . . . ,WK . This happens precisely when K ≤ N .
In particular, the case where K = N + 1 proves the “in
expectation” part of Proposition 10.
To achieve the “always surprised and oscillating” pattern,
we consider a prior π under which each each feature wi
is sampled independently from {0, 1}, but in a way that is
skewed towardsWi = 0 (e.g., Pr[Wi = 0] = 1− δ for some
small δ > 0). The result of this bias is that no matter which
features get revealed, the judge will always be more likely to
believe that “no more features with valueWi = 1 are com-
ing” — in other words, the judge will be very confident in
their belief while, at the same time, shifting this belief from
0 to 1 and back each round.
Distracting evidence. For some questions, there are mis-
leading arguments that appear plausible and then require ex-
tensive counter-argumentation to be proven false. By mak-
ing such arguments, a dishonest debater can stall the de-
bate, until the judge “runs out of patience” and goes with
their possibly-wrong surface impression of the topic. To il-
lustrate the idea, consider the uniform distribution π over
W = [0, 1]N and a question qf about some f : W → [0, 1]
that only depends on the first K features. Suppose, for con-
venience of notation, that the debaters give answers a1 = 1,
a2 = 0 and the sampled world is s.t. f(w) = 1 and
8Recall that ψ has value 0 or 1, depending on whether the num-
ber of features i ≤ K with wi = 1 is even or odd.
wK+1 = wK+2 = · · · = 1. To adversarially modify f ,
we first define a function S : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] as S(x, y) = 1
if either x 6= 1 or x = y = 1 and as S(x, y) = 0 other-
wise. By replacing f by f ′(w) := f(w)S(wm, wn), where
n > m > K , S introduces an “unlikely problem” x = 1
and an “equally unlikely fix” y = 1, thus allowing the dis-
honest player 2 to “stall” for one round. Indeed, the pres-
ence of S(·, ·) doesn’t initially affect the expected value of
the function in any way. However, if player 2 reveals that
Wm = wm = 1, the expectation immediately drops to
0, forcing player 1 to “waste one round” by revealing that
Wn = wn = 1. To make matters worse yet, we could ask
about fˆ ′(w) := f(w)Πdi=1S(wmi , wni), or use a more pow-
erful stalling function S(x, y1 ∧ · · · ∧ yk) that forces the
honest player to waste k rounds to “explain away” a single
argument of the opponent.
4.3 Detecting Debate Failures
When a debater is certain that their opponent will not get a
chance to react, they can get away with making much bolder
claims.9 The resulting “unfairness” is not a direct source for
concern because the order of play can easily be randomized
or made simultaneous. However, we may wish to measure
the last-mover advantage in order to detect whether a debate
is tracking truth as intended. The proof of Lemma 8 (in par-
ticular, equation (5)) yields the following result:
Corollary 11 (Last-mover advantage). If optimal debaters
in the feature debate Fπ(f,N) give answers a1, a2 ∈
[fˆ↑↓N (w), fˆ
↓↑
N (w)], the debater who argues second will ob-
tain |a1 − a2| expected utility.
Recall that, by Lemma 8, all answers from the inter-
val [fˆ↑↓N (w), fˆ
↓↑
N (w)] are optimal. Corollary 11 thus implies
that even if the agents debate optimally, some portion of
their utility – up to δ := fˆ↓↑N (w) − fˆ↑↓N (w) – depends
on the randomized choice of argumentation order.10 Inci-
dentally, Lemma 8 implies that the smallest possible de-
bate error is δ/2 (which occurs when the true answer is
f(w) = (fˆ↑↓N (w) − fˆ↓↑N (w))/2). This relationship justifies
a simple, common-sense heuristic: If the utility difference
caused by reversing the argumentation order is significant,
our debate is probably far from truth-promoting.
5 Two Important Special Cases of Debate
As a general principle, a narrower class of debates might
allow for more detailed (and possibly stronger) guarantees.
We describe two such sub-classes of general debates and
illustrate their properties on variants of feature debate.
5.1 Debate with Independent Evidence
When evaluating solution proposals in practice, we some-
times end up weighing its “pros” and “cons”. In a way,
9Conversely, some realistic debates might provide first-mover
advantage due to anchoring and framing effects.
10For illustration, a (literally) extreme case of last-mover advan-
tage occurs in the “oscillatory” debate from Section 4.2, where the
interval [fˆ↑↓N (w), fˆ
↓↑
N (w)] spans the whole answer space [0, 1].
we are viewing these arguments as (statistically) indepen-
dent evidence related to the problem at hand. This is often a
reasonable approximation, e.g., when deciding which car to
buy, and sometimes an especially good one, e.g., when inter-
preting questionnaire results from different but independent
respondents. We now show how to model these scenarios as
feature debates with statistically independent features, and
demonstrate the particularly favourable properties.
Feature debate with independent evidence. As a math-
ematical model of such setting, we consider X = {0, 1},
W := Π∞i=1[0, 1], and denote byWi : (w, x) 7→ wi ∈ [0, 1]
and X : (w, x) 7→ x ∈ {0, 1} the coordinate projections
in W × X . Informally, we view the last coordinate as an
unknown feature of the world and the debate we construct
will be asking “What is the value of this unknown feature?”.
To enable inference about X , we consider some probabil-
ity distribution P on W × X . (For convenience, we as-
sume P is discrete.) Finally, to be able to treat arguments
of the form “Wi = wi” as independent evidence related
to X , we assume that the features Wi, i ∈ N, are mutu-
ally independent conditional on X .11 To describe this set-
ting as a feature-debate, we define π as the marginalization
of P onto W and consider the question q = “How likely is
x = 1 in our world?”, i.e. “what is the value of f , where
f(w) := E P [X | W = w]”. We denote the resulting “inde-
pendent evidence” feature debate Fπ(q,N) as F
ie(P, N).
Judge’s belief and its updates. Firstly, recall that any
probability can be represented using its odds form, which
is equivalent to the corresponding log-odds form:
P(A) ∈ [0, 1]←→ P(A)/P(¬A) ∈ [0,∞]
←→ log(P(A)/P(¬A)) ∈ [−∞,∞].
Moreover, when expressed in the log-odds form, Bayes’ rule
states that updating one’s belief in hypothesis H in light of
evidenceA is equivalent to shifting the log-odds of the prior
belief by log (P (A | H) /P (A | ¬H)).
At any point in the debate F ie(P, N), the judge’s belief
fˆ(w~i) = E [f | W~i = w] is, by the definition of f , equal
to the conditional probability P (X = 1 | W~i = w~i). To
see how the belief develops over the course of the debate,
denote by β~i(w) the corresponding log-odds form. Initially,
fˆ∅(w) is equal to the prior P(X = 1), which corresponds to
β∅(w) = log(P(X = 1)/P(X = 0)) =: p0. Denoting
evj(w) := log
(
P(Wj = wj | X = 1)
P(Wj = wj | X = 0)
)
,
the above form of the Bayes’ rule implies that upon hearing
an argument “Wj = wj”, the judge will update their belief
according to the formula β~i,j(w) = β~i(w)+evj(w). In other
words, the arguments in F ie(P, N) combine additively:
β~in(w) = p0 + evi1(w) + · · ·+ evin(w). (2)
11In other words, P(Wj = wj | X = x) is equal to P(Wj =
wj | X = x,W~ik = w~ik ) for every x, wj , and w~ik .
Optimal strategies and evidence strength. Recall that
positive (negative) log-odds correspond to probabilities
closer to 1 (resp. 0). Equation (2) thus suggests that for
any w, the arguments N can be split into three “piles” from
which the debaters select arguments: N↑ := {j ∈ N |
evj(w) > 0} containing arguments supporting the answer
“X = 1 with probability 100%”, the pile N↓ = {j ∈ N |
evj(w) < 0} of arguments in favor of the opposite, and the
irrelevant argumentsNir = {j ∈ N | evj(w) = 0}. As long
as the debaters give different answers, one of them will use
arguments from N↓, while the other will only use N↑(w)
(both potentially falling back to Nir if their pile runs out).12
Moreover, a rational debater will always use the strongest ar-
guments from their pile, i.e. those with the highest evidence
strength |evj(w)|. Correspondingly, we denote the “total
evidence strength” that a players can muster in n rounds as
Ev↑n(w) := max
{∑
j∈J evik(w) | J ⊂ N, |J | = n
}
and
Ev↓n(w) := max
{∑
j∈J (−evik(w)) | J ⊂ N, |J | = n
}
.
(To make the discussion meaningful, we assume the evi-
dence sequence (evj(w))j is bounded and themaxima above
are well-defined.) The equation (2) implies that – among op-
timal debaters – one always selects arguments correspond-
ing to Ev
↑
N (w) while the other aims for Ev
↓
N (w). Since
this holds independently of the argumentation order, we get
fˆ↑↓N (w) = fˆ
↓↑
N (w). Together with Lemma 8, this observation
yields the following result:
Corollary 12 (Unique optimal answer). In the answering
phase of any F ie(P, N) with bounded evidence, the only
Nash equilibrium is to select the fˆ∗N(w) which satisfies
fˆ↑↓N (w) = fˆ
↓↑
N (w) = fˆ
∗
N (w) := the probability
corresponding to the log-odds p0 + Ev
↑
N (w) − Ev↓N (w).
Debate error. To compute the debate error in F ie(P, ·),
denote the strength of the evidence that remains in each de-
bater’s “evidence pile” after n rounds as
R↑n(w) :=
∑
j∈N↑
evj(w) − Ev↑n(w), (3)
R↓n(w) :=
∑
j∈N↓
(−evj(w)) − Ev↓n(w). (4)
Furthermore, assume that additionally to (evj(w))j being
bounded, the total evidence limn→∞ Evan(w) in favor of a
is infinite for at most one a ∈ {↑, ↓}.13 Since the true an-
swer f(w) = P(X = 1 | W = w) corresponds to p0 +∑
i∈N evj(w) = p0+
∑
j∈N↑ evj(w)−
∑
j∈N↓(−evj(w)),
the difference between the (log-odds forms of) the judge’s
final belief and the optimal answer is R↑N (w)− R↓N (w).
12Formally, these argumentation incentives follow from the first
paragraph in the proof of Lemma 8.
13Note that the intuition “limnR
(·)
n (w) = 0” only fits if either
Na or Nie is infinite. If a debater eventually has to reveal evidence
against their own case, the numbers R
(·)
n (w) will get negative.
Early stopping and online estimation of the debate error.
If we further assume that the debaters reveal the strongest
pieces of evidence first, we can predict a debate’s outcome
before all N rounds have passed. If the n-th argument of
player p has strength |evi(w)| =: sp,n(w), we know that
further N − n rounds of debate cannot reveal more than
(N − n)sp,n(w) evidence in favor of p. This implies that as
soon as the currently-losing player is no longer able to shift
the judge’s belief beyond the midpoint between the initial
answers, we can stop the debate without affecting its out-
come. If we further know that the question at hand depends
on K features or less, we can also bound the difference be-
tween f(w) and fˆ(w~i). Indeed, in the worst-case scenario,
all remaining arguments were all in favor of the same player
p — even in this case, the (log-odds form of) f(w) can be
no further thanmaxp=1,2 sp,N (w)(K − 2N) away from the
log-odds form of the final belief fˆ(w~i2N ).
5.2 Debate with Information-Limited Arguments
Sometimes, a single argument cannot convey all relevant in-
formation about a given feature of the world. For example,
we might learn that a personA lives in a cityB, but not their
full address, or – in the language of feature debate – learn
that wi lies in the interval [0.5, 1], rather than understanding
right away that wi = 0.75. In such cases, it becomes crucial
to model the judge’s information bandwidth as limited.
Feature Debate Representation. In feature debate, we
can represent each elementary feature wi ∈ [0, 1] in its bi-
nary form (e.g., (0.75)2 = 0.11000 . . . ), and correspond-
ingly assume that each argument reveals one bit of some wi.
More specifically, we assume that (a) the debaters make ar-
guments of the form “the n-th bit of i-th feature has value b”,
(b) they have to reveal the n-th bit ofwi before its (n+1)-th
bit, and – using the same argument as in feature debate – (c)
their claims are always truthful. Informally, each argument
in this “information-limited” feature14 debate F lπ(f,N) thus
corresponds to selecting a dimension i ∈ N and doing a
“50% zoom” on w along this dimension (Figure 1).
Performance bounds. By offering intermediate steps be-
tween features being completely unknown and fully re-
vealed, the debate F ie(·) allows for more nuanced guaran-
14The name is justified since N2 is isomorphic to N and thus
F lπ(f,N) is formally equivalent to some feature debate Fπ˜(f˜ , N).
w w w w
Figure 1: Each argument in an information-limited debate
reduces the set of feasible worlds by “zooming-in” on the
sampled world w = (0.6, 0.25) along one dimension ofW .
Here, the first two arguments provide information about w1
(the x-axis) and the third one about w2.
tees than those from Section 4.1. (Informally stated, the as-
sumptions of the Proposition 13 can be read as “the values of
f differ by at mostL across different worlds, with featurewi
being responsible for up to a 1
2i
-fraction15 of the variance”.)
Proposition 13. Suppose that f : W → R is L-Lipschitz
continuous16 w.r.t. the metric ρ(w,w′) =
∑
i∈N 2
−i|wi−w′i|
onW . Then F lπ(f,N) is L/2⌊
√
N⌋-truth promoting.
In contrast to Proposition 9, the L-Lipschitz assumption thus
allows us to get approximately correct debate outcomes long
before having full knowledge of all features. Note that the
importance of Proposition 13 is not in the particular choice
of weights, but rather in showing that argument weights can
be translated into debate error bounds.
6 Limitations and Future Work
The language introduced so far does not fully capture all as-
pects of realistic AI debates — due to space limitations, it is
simply not possible to cover all design variants and emergent
phenomena in this initial work. In this section, we outline
some notable avenues for making the debate model more
accurate and useful, either by using an alternative instantia-
tion of the general framework from Section 2 or by extend-
ing the toy model from Section 3. We start by discussing
the modifications which are likely to improve the debate’s
performance or applicability, and follow-up by those which
could introduce new challenges. For suggested future work
on AI debate that is not specific to modelling, we refer the
reader to Irving, Christiano, and Amodei (2018).
6.1 Plausible Improvements to Debate
Commitments and high-level claims. As
Irving, Christiano, and Amodei (2018) suggest, an im-
portant reason why debate might work is that the debaters
can make abstract or high-level claims that can potentially
be falsified in the course of the debate. For example,
debaters might start out disagreeing whether a given image
— of which the judge can only inspect a single pixel —
depicts a dog or a cat. Debater 1 might then claim that “here
in the middle, there is a brown patch that is the dog’s ear”, to
which their opponent counters “the brown patch is a collar
on an otherwise white cat”. Such exchanges would continue
until one debater makes a claim that is (i) inconsistent
with their answer, (ii) inconsistent with “commitments”
created by previous arguments, or (iii) specific enough to be
verified by the judge. In this example, (iii) might arise with
an exchange “this pixel is white, which could not happen
if it belonged to a brown dog’s ear”, “actually, the pixel is
brown”, which allows the judge to determine the winner by
inspecting the pixel.
This ability to make high-level claims and create new
commitments will often make the debate more time-efficient
15While similar results hold for general “weight ratios” between
features, we chose weights 1
2i
for their notational convenience.
16A function is Lipschitz continuous with constant L ≥ 0 (w.r.t.
a metric ̺) if it satisfies |f(x)− f(y)| ≤ L̺(x, y).
and incentivize consistency. Since consistency should typi-
cally advantage debaters that describe the true state of the
world, commitments and high-level claims seem critical for
the success of debate. We thus need a communication lan-
guage Lc that is rich enough to enable more abstract argu-
ments and a set of effect rules (Prakken, 2006) which spec-
ify how new arguments affect the debaters’ commitments.
To reason about such debates, we further need a model
which relates the different commitments, to arguments, ini-
tial answers, and each other.
One way to get such a model is to view W as the set of
assignments for a Bayesian network. In such setting, each
question q ∈ Q would ask about the value of some node in
W , arguments would correspond to claims about node val-
ues, and their connections would be represented through the
structure of the network. Such a model seems highly struc-
tured, amenable to theoretical analysis, and, in the authors’
opinion, intuitive. It is, however, not necessarily useful for
practical implementations of debate, since Bayes networks
are computationally expensive and difficult to obtain.
Detecting misbehaviour. One possible failure of debate is
the occurrence of stalling, manipulation, collusion, or selec-
tive provision of evidence. To remedy these issues, we can
introduce specific countermeasures for these strategies. One
option for quantifying the contribution of discourse to a hu-
man’s understanding is to measure the changes in their abil-
ity to pass “exams” (Armstrong, 2017b). Another counter-
measure would be to instantiate a meta-debate on the ques-
tion of whether a debater is arguing fairly. However, such a
meta-debate may, in some cases be even more challenging
to judge correctly than the original question.
Alternative utility functions. We have considered utility
functions that are linear in each debater’s deviation ∆p :=
|fˆ(w~i) − ap| from the judge’s belief. However, other ap-
proaches such as “divide the total reward in proportion to
1
∆p
” might give different but interesting results.
Real-world correspondence. To learn which real-world
debates are useful on the one hand, and which theoretical is-
sues to address on the other, a better understanding of the
correspondence between abstract debate models and real-
world debates is needed. For example, which real-world de-
bates can be modelled as having independent evidence, be-
ing Lipschitz, having distracting arguments, and so on?
6.2 Obstacles in Realistic Debates
Sub-optimal judges. Some debates might have a canoni-
cal idealized way of being judged, which the actual judge
deviates from at some steps. A fruitful avenue for future
research is to investigate the extent to which debate fails
gracefully as the judge deviates from this ideal. For exam-
ple, games are canonically judged as giving a score of 1
to the winner and 0 to the loser. We could thus measure
how much (and in what ways) the utility function can be
modified before the game’s winner is changed. Another ap-
proach would be to consider a judge that was biased. An un-
biased Bayesian judge would set the prior to the true world-
distribution, update the prior on each revealed piece of ev-
idence, and, at the end of the debate, calculate the corre-
sponding expectation over answers. To model a judge who
performs the first step imperfectly, we could consider a bi-
ased prior π˜ ∈ ∆W (distinct from the true world distribution
π) and calculate the utilities using the corresponding biased
belief˜ˆf(w~i) := E π˜
[
f |W~i = w~i
]
.
Manipulation. So far, we have described failures that
come from “the judge being imperfect in predictable ways”.
However, real-world debates might also give rise to unde-
sirable argumentation strategies inconceivable in the corre-
sponding simplified model. For example, a debater might
learn to exploit a bug in the implementation of the debate
or, analogously, find a “bug” in the human judge. Worse yet,
debatersmight attempt to manipulate the judge using bribery
or coercion. Note that for such tactics to work, the debaters
need not be able to carry out their promises and threats — it
is merely required that the judge believes they can.
Collusion. Without the assumption of zero-sum rewards,
the debaters gain incentives to collaborate, possibly at the
expense of the accuracy of the debate. Such “I won’t tell
on you if you don’t tell on me” incentives might arise, for
example, if both agents are given a positive reward if both
answers seem good (or negative reward when the debate be-
comes inconclusive).
Sub-optimal debaters. If debaters argue sub-optimally,
we might see new types of fallacious arguments. We should
also expect to see stronger debaters win even in situations
that advantage their weaker opponent. There could also be
cases where the losing player complicates the debate game
on purpose to increase variance in the outcome. Both of
these phenomena can be observed between humans in games
like Go, and we should expect analogous phenomena in gen-
eral AI debate. One way of modelling asymmetric capabili-
ties is to let two debaters run the same debating algorithm
with a different computational budget (e.g., Monte Carlo
tree search with a different number of rollouts).
7 Related Work
AI safety via debate. The kind of debate we sought to
model was introduced in (Irving, Christiano, and Amodei,
2018), wherein it was proposed as a scheme for safely re-
ceiving advice from highly capable AI systems. In the same
work, Irving et al. carried out debate experiments on the
MNIST dataset and proposed a promising analogy between
AI debates and the complexity class PSPACE. We believe
this analogy can be made compatible with the framework
introduced in our Section 2, and deserves further attention.
Kovarˇı´k (2019) then demonstrated how to use debate to
train an image classifier and described the design elements
of debate in more detail. AI debate is closely related to
two other proposals: (1) “factored cognition” (Ought, 2018),
in which a human decomposes a difficult task into sub-
tasks, each of which they can solve in a manageable time
(similarly to how debate eventually zooms in on an easily-
verifiable claim), and (2) “iterated distillation and amplifi-
cation” (Christiano, Shlegeris, and Amodei, 2018), in which
a “baseline human judgement” is automated and amplified,
similarly to how AI debates might be automated.
Previous works on argumentation. Persuasion and ar-
gumentation have been extensively studied in areas such
as logic, computer science, and law. The introduction by
Prakken (2006) describes a language particularly suitable
for our purposes. Conversely, the extensive literature on ar-
gumentation frameworks (Dung, 1995) seems less relevant.
The main reasons are (i) its focus on non-monotonic reason-
ing (where it is possible to retract claims) and (ii) that it as-
sumes the debate language and argument structure as given,
whereas we wish to study the connection between arguments
and an underlying world model. AI systems are also being
trained to identify convincing natural-language arguments
— for a recent example, see, e.g., Perez et al. (2019).
Zero-sum games. As noted in the introduction, we can
view two-player zero-sum games as a debate that aims to
identify the game’s winner (or an optimal strategy). Such
games thus serve as a prime example of a problem for
which the state of the art approach is (interpretable as) de-
bate (Silver et al., 2017). Admittedly, only a small number
of problems are formulated as two-player zero-sum games
by default. However, some problems can be reformulated as
such games: While it is currently unclear how widely appli-
cable such “problem gamification” is, it has been used for
combinatorial problems (Xu and Lieberherr, 2019) and the-
orem proving (Japaridze, 2009). Together with Silver et al.
(2017), these examples give some evidence that the AI de-
bate might be competitive (with other problem-solving ap-
proaches) for a wider range of tasks.
8 Conclusion
We have introduced a general framework for modelling AI
debates that aim to amplify the capabilities of their judge
and formalized the problem of designing debates that pro-
mote accurate answers. We described and investigated “fea-
ture debate”, an instance of the general framework where
the debaters can only make statements about “elementary
features” of the world. In particular, we showed that if the
debaters have enough time to make all relevant arguments,
feature debates promote truth.We gave examples of two sub-
classes of debate: those where the arguments provide sta-
tistically independent evidence about the answers and those
where the importance of different arguments is bounded in a
known manner. We have shown that feature debates belong-
ing to these sub-classes are approximately truth-promoting
long before having had time to converge fully. However,
we also identified some feature-debate questions that incen-
tivize undesirable behaviour such as stalling, confusing the
judge, or exploiting the judge’s biases, resulting in debates
that are unfair, unstable, and generally insufficiently truth-
promoting. Despite its simplicity, feature debate thus allows
for modelling phenomena that are highly relevant to issues
we expect to encounter in realistic debates. Moreover, its
simplicity makes feature debate well-suited for the initial
exploration of problems with debate and testing of the cor-
responding solution proposals. Finally, we outlined multiple
ways in which our model could be made more realistic —
among these, allowing debaters to make high-level claims
seems like an especially promising avenue.
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A Proofs
We now give the full proofs of the results from the main text.
Proof of Lemma 8. Fix π, f , w, and N , and denote Λ :=
[fˆ↑↓, fˆ↓↑] := [fˆ↑↓N (w), fˆ
↓↑
N (w)]. By definition of u1(t) :=
|fˆ(w~i)−a2|− |fˆ(w~i)−a1|, the utility u1 is non-decreasing
in fˆ(w~i) when a1 ≥ a2 (and in turn, u2 is non-increasing in
fˆ(w~i)). It follows that an optimal argumentation strategy is
for player 1 to maximize fˆ(w~i) and for player 2 to minimize
it (and vice versa when a1 ≤ a2). When calculating utili-
ties, we can, therefore, assume that the final belief is either
fˆ(w~i) = fˆ
↑↓ or fˆ(w~i) = fˆ
↓↑, depending on whether the
player who argues second gave the higher or lower answer.
Suppose the players gave answers {a, b}, and the one ar-
guing for b goes second. In this scenario, denote by v∗(a, b)
the utility this player receives if both argument optimally.
By applying the above observation (about optimal argumen-
tation strategies) in all possible relative positions of a, b, and
fˆ↑↓ ≤ fˆ↓↑, we deduce that
v∗(a, b) = |a− b| − dist(b,Λ). (5)
Denote by v∗1(a1, a2) :=
1
2
v∗(a2, a1) − 12v∗(a1, a2) the
expected utility of player 1 if answers a1 and a2 are given
(by players 1 and 2) and players argument optimally (the
expectation is w.r.t. the randomized argumentation order).
Using the formula for v∗(a, b), we get
v∗1(a1, a2) =
1
2
v∗(a2, a1)− 1
2
v∗(a1, a2)
=
1
2
(|a− b| − dist(a1,Λ))− 1
2
(|a− b| − dist(a2,Λ))
=
1
2
dist(a2,Λ)− 1
2
dist(a1,Λ).
It follows that, independently of what strategy the opponent
uses, it is always beneficial to give answers from within Λ
(and that within this interval, all answers are equally good in
expectation).17
Proof of Proposition 10. For the worst-case part, suppose
that π is a uniform distribution over [0, 1]N, w = 1, and let
ϕ := W1 ∧ · · · ∧WN+1 be as in Sec. 4.2. In Fπ(ϕ,N), we
have ϕˆ(w~i) = 1 if
~i ⊃ {1, . . . , N + 1} and ϕˆ(w~i) = 0
otherwise. In particular, we have ϕˆ↑↓N (w) = ϕˆ
↓↑
N (w) =
0, since the minimizing player can always select ik from
N \ {1, . . . , N + 1}. Since ϕ(w) = 1, the result follows
from Lemma 8.
For the “in expectation” part, suppose that π is a uniform
distribution over {0, 1}N+1 (where each w ∈ {0, 1}N+1 is
extended by an infinite sequence of zeros) and ψ(w) :=
xor(w1, . . . , wN+1). Recall that the value of ψ(w) will be
1 if the total number of wi-s with wi = 1 is odd and 0 when
the number is even. Until all of the N + 1 features of any w
17Incidentally, a more interesting behavior arises if the order of
argumentation is fixed; in such a case, player 2 “flips a coin” be-
tween fˆ↑↓ and fˆ↓↑ and player 1 picks any of the strategies σ1 with
supp (σ1) ⊂ Λ and E [a1 | a1 ∼ σ1] =
1
2
(fˆ↑↓ + fˆ↓↑).
are revealed, there will be a 50% prior probability of an odd
number of them having value 1 and 50% prior probability of
an even number of them having value 1. As a result, we have
ψˆ(w~i) =
1
2
unless~i ⊃ {1, . . . , N+1}. By not revealing any
of these features in Fπ(ψ,N), either of the players can thus
achieve ψˆ(w~i) =
1
2
. It follows that ψˆ↑↓N (w) = ψˆ
↓↑
N (w) =
1
2
,
the only optimal strategy is to give the answer a = 1
2
, and—
since f takes on only values 0 and 1 – the expected debate
error is 1
2
.
Our counterexample function ϕ was discontinuous. How-
ever, the same result could be achieved by using f(w) :=
ΠN+1i=1 wi together with the uniform prior over {0, 1}N —
this yields a function that is continuous over its (dis-
crete) domain. Alternatively, we could use the uniform prior
over [0, 1]N together with the continuous approximation
ΠN+1i=1 w
K
i (for some largeK ∈ N) of ϕ. Similarly, we could
find a continuous approximation of ψ. This observation con-
cludes the proof of the last part of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 13. Let w ∈ W . For~i, denote byW(~i)
the set of worlds w′ would reveal the same bits as w under
the argument sequence~i. To show that the debate is ǫ-truth
promoting in w, it suffices, by Lemma 8, to show that
f(w) − ǫ ≤ fˆ↑↓N (w) and fˆ↓↑N (w) ≤ f(w) + ǫ.
To get the second inequality, recall that fˆ↓↑N (w) is defined
as the expected value of f under the judge’s belief after
N rounds of debate, under the assumption that player 1 at-
tempts to drive the expectation as low as possible and player
2 as high as possible. Suppose that the player who is the first
to argue chooses his arguments i1, i3, i5, . . . in a way that
minimizes the diameter max{ρ(w,w′) | w′ ∈ W(~i)} of
W(~i), i.e. by following the sequence (1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 1, . . . ).
A simple calculation shows that after N = 1 + · · · + n
rounds, this necessarily gets the diameter ofW(~i) to n+2
2n+1
or
less (depending on the opponent’s actions i2, i4, . . . ). Since
f is L-Lipschitz, we get that f(w′) ≤ f(w) + L · n+2
2n+1
on
W(~i). Since the optimal strategy of minimizing fˆ↓↑N (w) can
perform no worse than this, we get fˆ↓↑N (w) ≤ f(w) + L ·
n+2
2n+1
.
We derive the first inequality analogously. To finish the
proof, we need to rewrite the inequality in terms of N . We
have n+2
2n+1
≤ 2n
2n+1
≤ 1
2n
. Since we have N ≥ 1 + · · · +
⌊√N⌋ for eachN ∈ N, we get fˆ↓↑N (w) ≤ f(w)+L · 12⌊√N⌋ ,
which concludes the proof.
